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In a recent paper, Keith Yandetl introduces an argument which seems to make 
short work of the problem of evil .1 Unfortunately, this line of argument is radical- 
ly unsatisfactory, and the problem which the existence of evil poses for theism 
- whatever that problem is - cannot be disposed of in that ready way. 
Yandell begins by calling attention to the following proposition: 
(N) Necessarily, if God allows any evil, then He has morally sufficient 
reason for doing so. 
And he goes on to say that if (N) is true then any particular evil has the following 
property: 
(P) If God exists, then He has morally sufficient reason for allowing this 
evil. 
Yandell then asserts the crucial thesis of his argument. He says that "it seems clear 
that any evil that has P is not an evil whose existence provides evidence against 
God's existence. An evil that has P is useless for the critic's purposes ... If  (N) is 
true, then every evil, and all evil together, is critically cancelled. ''2 
Now, it is true that if (N) is true then (P) is true of every actual evil (but it need 
not be true of every possible, or prospective, evil). This is so because, if God exists, 
then every actual evil is an evil which is allowed by God (whom Yandell assumes 
to be "omnicompetent"). But, according to (N), God allows no evil without a 
morally sufficient reason. Hence, if (N) is true then (P) is true of every actual evil. 
And no doubt Yandell intended (P) to be construed as applying to actual evils, 
and not to merely possible evils. So far, so good. 
But how does that show that if (N) is true then every actual evil is "critically 
cancelled"? 
Yandell provides no argument whatsoever for this claim. He says merely that 
"it seems clear." In fact, however, it is not at all clear. But we may hazard a con- 
jecture about how it might come to "seem" clear. What is true is that an evil which 
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is such that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing it - which is, we 
might say, morally allowable by God - provides no genuine evidence against the 
existence of God. And it might be supposed that (P) is the property of being moral- 
ly allowable by God. If we were to construe (P) in this way, then we would get 
Yandell's conclusion and we would put an end to the problem of evil. In fact, 
however, (P) is not the property of being morally allowable by God. It is, rather, 
the conditional property of being morally allowable by God i f  God exists. And 
that is quite a different property. 
Before going into this point somewhat further, we might note that YandeU's 
basic line of argument here need not be made to depend on (N), or upon any 
other theological thesis. This might be of some importance for Yandell himself, 
because later in his paper he argues that (N) is false, a In fact, the status of (N) is 
inconsequential for the present line of argument, for (N) can be replaced by the 
following less controversial principle: 
(N*) Any two things which co-exist are logically compatible with one 
another. 
If (N*) is true, then any actual evil has the following property: 
(P*) If God exists, then His existence is logically compatible with the 
existence of this evil. 
And if it seems clear that any evil which has (P) is critically cancelled, then it 
will also seem clear in the same way that any evil which has (P*) is critically can- 
celled. For if an evil has the property of being compatible with the existence of 
God, then it does not provide genuine evidence against the existence of God. And 
(P*) might be thought to be the property of being compatible with the existence 
of God. 
Not only does Yandell's line of argument here need no theological assumptions, 
it need not be restricted to any theological context. It can be used to argue that 
no fact whatsoever provides any evidence against anything at all. Everything is 
thus critically cancelled. 
Think, for example, of a murder. It is widely suspected that the friendly neigh- 
borhood hit man, affectionately known as "Shark," is the murderer. But it is soon 
established as an undeniable fact that: 
(M) Less than half an hour after the murder, Shark was attending a sym- 
posium on medical ethics 300 miles away. 
Some people believe that (M) provides evidence, practically conclusive evidence, 
against the hypothesis that Shark is the murderer. A Yandellian, however, would 
easily argue that this is not the case. He would observe that since Shark's atten- 
dance at the symposium is an actual event it must have the following property: 
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(P') If Shark committed the murder, then his committing the murder is 
compatible with this event. 
And it will seem clear to him that no event which has (P') can provide evidence 
against Shark's having committed the murder. But, of course, this strategy can be 
mounted against any proposed evidential fact whatsoever. Everything is thus 
critically cancelled. 
And we may, not surprisingly, come to suspect that there is something fishy 
about this line of argument. 
What is wrong here is that (P') is (or represents) a merely conditional property. 
It' is quite possible, therefore, that Shark's attendance at the symposium is such 
that (P') is true of it, and also such that the following proposition is true of it: 
(K) This event is completely incompatible with Shark's having committed 
the murder. 
And the epistemic bearing of Shark's attendance at the symposium on the possi- 
bility of his having committed the murder is a function of (K) rather than of (P'). 
Or, we might say, (K) dominates (P') with respect to evidential significance. If 
both (K) and (P') are true of that event, then Shark did not commit the murder. 
The trouble with both of the more theological principles, (P) and (P*), for 
Yandell's purposes, is that they too are (or represent) merely conditional proper- 
ties. They are hypotheticals whose antecedent is "God exists." If this antecedent 
is true, then indeed every actual evil is morally allowable by God and is logically 
compatible with God. But if the antecedent is false, then some actual evils may 
have the conditional properties (P) and (P*) even if they also have the categorical 
properties of not being morally allowable by God and not being logically compati- 
ble with God. We cannot, therefore, determine whether any actual evil has the 
property of being compatible with the existence of God merely by noting that it 
has property (P) or (P*). Indeed, if (N*) is true, then every actual state of affairs, 
whether evil or not, has (P*). But with respect to the evidential force of an actual 
evil, these properties are dominated by the presence or absence of the property 
of compatibility with the existence of God. That is where the theist must make 
his argument. 
We can think of the dialectical situation in this way. Suppose that the professed 
atheist, developing his version of the problem of evil, calls attention to some actual 
evil, El,  and asserts that E 1 is so bad, so destructive, so pointless, etc., etc., that 
(1) E 1 cannot be morally allowable by God, and it is logically incom- 
patible with the existence of (an omnicompetent) God. 
He then concludes that 
(2) Therefore, there is no (omnicompetent) God. 
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Now, a person who accepts Yandell's claim about the crRical cancellation of 
evils might insist on asserting that 
(3) If God exists, then He has a morally sufficient reason for allowing 
E 1 , and/or if God exists, then His existence is logically compatible with the 
existence of E 1 . 
The atheist, however, has no objection at all to (3). He accepts it cheerfully (as well 
as accepting the principles from which it is derived). He says that he is quite willing 
to add it to the premises of his own argument. He takes it to be a necessary truth, 





that making it explicit will simply make the structure of his argument 
(1) and (3) formally entail (2) by modus tollens. What could be clearer 
the theist get anything valuable for his own purposes out of these hy- 
He might assert 
(4) God exists. 
(4) and (3) together entail the denial o f ( l ) ,  and that would seem to be fatal to the 
atheist's argument. This strategy, however, would not be open to Yandell. For he 
begins his paper by saying that it would be inappropriate, in a discussion of the 
problem of evil, to assume that God exists. Without (4), however,(3) seems to be 
of no use to the theist. (3), in fact, is the common property of the theist and the 
atheist. In conjunction with (1) it entails the denial of (4). And in conjunction with 
(4) it entails the denial of (1). 
In a context, therefore, in which the existence of God can be assumed and ap- 
pealed to, principles such as (P) and (P*) are useful to the theist. They enable him 
to infer the status of the actual evils in the world vis d vis God. But in a context 
in which the theist cannot already appeal to the existence of God, these principles 
are useless. It seems unlikely, therefore, that they will divert the force of any se- 
rious objection based on the existence of evil in the world. 
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